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RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND THE GOSPEL OF RECONCILIATION
Miklós Tomka
Professor Dr. Miklós Tomka, a sociologist, is Director of the Hungarian Center of Religious
Research, and author of the book Church, State and Society in Eastern Europe. He has been one of
the editors of Continuom for many years. The following was presented as the opening lecture at a
plenary assembly of the International Association of Mission Studies (IAMS), held in Balatonfüred,
Hungary, August 2009. 
The title for this reflection implies four presuppositions which are not at all self-evident.
Identity, whether personal or social, seems to be taken as an unquestioned entity, to which we need
to give some second thoughts. Secondly, the use of the term religious identity suggests the belief,
that there is a general religious identity, which would be at least partially valid for all religions.
Third, the verbally established association between religious identity and reconciliation entails 
trust in such a relationship. Fourth, the theme of this congress  seems to suggest the conviction that1
religious identities may contribute to reconciliation. All these hidden presuppositions need
verification especially because of changes resulting from modernity. Beyond theoretical
considerations we will use data from Eastern European surveys for purposes of demonstration,
keeping in mind the extraordinary speed of modernization in this region, and for specifying our
topic for this region. 
Sociology defines modernity with three key notions. The first one refers to the rather
technical and formal process of rationalization, specialization and subsequent social segmentation.
The second one relates to the changing character of the social system, especially to the declining
ordering role of tradition and social control. The third concept is individualization. It refers to
individual consequences of both previous processes, by emphasizing the growing freedom and
loneliness of individuals, as well as the threatening uncertainty with respect to goals and values.
The effect of the above processes for individuals is the dissolution of previous forms of self-
understanding and the urgent search for new ways of identity-construction.
The cumulative effect of purposive rationality (Weber) initiates specialization into distinct
autonomous spheres of life. Instead of the previous organism-like, unified pattern of social
organization which people experienced as natural and self-evident, the universe of society and
culture crumbles into a loosely knit mosaic, the parts of which are strange, often alienated from
each other, and independent of human control. Politics, work, entertainment, science,
communication. etc. develop their own goals, principles, organizational forms and also
expectations for the behavior of persons under their jurisdiction and/or power. Politics and
business, religion and technology are similarly eager to exclude interferences of other sub-systems
into their respective concerns. All these are autonomous micro-cosmoses, personified in social
groups of colleagues, neighbors, partners, allies etc. the relations to whom are shaped by the
respective sub-world. 
Under pre-modern conditions human relations extended to the totality of human existence.
In modernity borderlines of specific spheres determine the character and the limits of personal
relations, that have grown up and been defined within a particular context. Collegial relations
differ from political alliances or from fellowships in sport-clubs. The participation in these relations
is partial, related to but one specific aspect of life. Individuals try to preserve their relative
independence and inner wholeness by creating and defending their own sub-world in home and
family.
The second process is the devaluation of tradition and of all kind of social regulations as 
having an overall validity. Past conceptions of life and behavior lose their relevance and at best
preserve a limited utility and capacity for directing in modernity. 
Pre-modern humankind experienced a homogeneous world-view and a centrally and
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hierarchically outlined socio-cultural order.  The process of modernization replaced this
arrangement with a multitude of social sub-worlds, each of which with a specific pattern as derived
exclusively from its specific goals and functions. Family life has coordinates different from those
of work life, politics different from recreation. This differentiation functions in more specific fields
too. One specific workplace, like a bank  office, is usually organized totally differently from other
ones, like schools, mines, farms, the navy, or another enterprise. Differences extend to the
understanding of loyalty and morality and to institutional requirements from the workforce.
Socially transmitted regulations and patterns govern life and behavior only in concrete
circumstances and occasions, and in specific respects. The plurality and discordance of precepts
and regulations suspend the feeling of an absolute, cosmic order, and of a natural or an eternal
divine law.
As a consequence of the splintering of the social organizations that individuals participate
in, they have to adapt to differing subsystems and the respective different social groups. Changes
from one to another life-situation require frequent alterations of adaptation to new conditions and
switches in the coordinates of the evaluation of a situation and the appropriate behavior. The
increased need for adaptability is in itself a burden. The real challenge is, however, the
contradiction between demands coming from different subsystems but which are related to the
same decision. Religious and political morality clash again and again. The loyalty to workplace and
the honesty toward customers may collide, as business-related and family-oriented requirements
quite often do. Modern individuals received the freedom to choose between contradicting
expectations, between life-styles, between work-places and careers, between this or that kind of
friend. It is the necessity of making decisions that they cannot avoid. Yet the decisions are 
temporal, conditional, and transitory. The continuous changes in circumstances require continuous
repetitions and possibly revisions of previous decisions.
Most relevant decisions have consequences for social relations. Political preferences, church
membership, sports and entertainment, the place of living and the work-place determine social
networks in which one participates. A special quality of modernity consists in the diversity of social
milieus maintained by the same person. One participates differently in different settings. The
individual decides about the subjective relevance of different group-relations. Because of the
diversity of social relations and because of the ceaseless possibility to change their subjective
relevance, these relations restrict only slightly the freedom of individual decisions. The social
rejection of a decision in one milieu can be countered every time by support in another group.
The third concept refers to individualization, which expresses a personal maturation to
conditions of modernity. The modern person is independent from tradition and social constraints.
He/she is free in his/her decisions. He/she has to take them individually. He or she has to grow up
and acquire the ability to orient him or herself in the world of steadily changing alternatives. 
This freedom is simultaneously a blessing and a curse. It poses the problem of how to
justify decisions. The final instance is invariably the individual. But the individual itself needs a
self-definition. Social-psychology speaks about multiple identities referring to the multitude of
social scenes where a person is actively present. The multi-dimensionality of identity doesn’t
eliminate however the need for a center which establishes the relative relevance and regulates the
mutual relations of different levels or expressions of identity. Where can this center come from, if
neither history nor society is a sufficiently reliable point of reference? The creation, definition and
maintenance of identity are most urgent questions in modernity. They include the tension between
the experiences of past generations and the not yet discovered future prospects. Identity defines
social relations as well; consequently it contains the tension between individual autonomy and the
submission inherent in any belonging. The definition of identity is positioning one’s self between
past and future history and within the social context.
Modernity represents the loss of determinative social constraints. It is a big challenge
worldwide. It produced an exceptionally strong shock in Eastern and Central Europe. Prior to
communism a hierarchical class structure, feudal conditions and  a social order structured
organically into a single organized social order ruled most countries of Eastern and Central Europe.
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Communism promoted economic and technical modernization. Totalitarianism and the planned
economy hindered, however, the progression of social modernization. The party-state deprived
individuals of the possibility of alternatives, of initiatives, of independent decisions, of progression
in individualization. The official state ideology stressed a single truth and a single vision of human
and social fulfillment under the leadership of a single party. Communism was the anti-thesis of
human and social modernization. On the other hand the resistance against communist centralism
united people into one opposition. This oppositional stance severely restricted available
alternatives of behavior and froze social dynamics. The opposition too was captured by the
totalitarian system. The final effect was that communism polarized society into those who adapted
and those in opposition, blocking by this polarization the autonomous social development and
differentiation.
The breakdown of communism confronted 300 million people with the necessity of rapid
social differentiation and the appropriation of abilities which are indispensable for survival in
modernity. Only a small part of the population was able to meet these requirements. These people,
quite often members of the previous communist leadership, became the “winners” of the political
and socio-economical transformation. The big majority is aware of the new demands, but unable
to meet them. Tensions between wishes and abilities, between efforts and results, between Western
and Eastern economic success and quality of life, as well as overdone performances for the sake of
economic adjustment to Western standards contributed to the increase of heart disease, circulatory
and stress-diseases and to the shortening of life expectations. Central and Eastern Europeans live
5 to 16 years less than do people in Western countries (Tomka 1991).
Communism discredited previous social identities, obstructed and hindered community
relations and transformed individuals into solitary dependent servants of the political machine, the
ideology of which proclaimed the liberation and redemption of previously oppressed classes, yet
not those of individual persons. The collapse of the communist dream buried those identities which
were artificially fabricated by Marxist ideology and communist political practice. Only small and
decreasing minorities draw their identities from the socialist or communist past. Even less often
people define themselves in pre-communist categories. After forty and more years of communism
there is no way back to the earlier past. The jump into modernity and the construction of
corresponding impermanent identities cannot be avoided, although most people are not prepared
to act adequately. The process of individualization, which is instrumental to the emergence of
modern identities, is in its beginnings. Old empires and federal states disintegrated. New countries
and nations emerged. National minorities call for self-determination. Previous denominational
structures shifted (Tomka 2006a).
Globalization, the influence of Western capital, Western political dominance and new
religious communities coming from the West complicate the situation and challenge and make th
people feel insecure. Most new social and political units and structures don’t have strong enough
integrating ideas. Individuals are undecided with whom and with what should they associate and
identify themselves. The post-communist world is in fundamental identity crisis individually, and
socially. The establishment of social identities, as well as the finding of strategies for the definition
of individual identities is a matter of survival in post-communist Europe. The question is which
means can help to accomplish this work. In performing these tasks two uneven vehicles seem to
be successfully instrumental: the national idea and religion. It is the second one on which we will
concentrate our interest.
Critics of the secularization thesis bring a new aspect into the discussion. They agree that
the unity and organic coherence of society was dispersed. They acknowledge the multi-centric
nature and the multitude of sub-system regulations in plural society. They concede that the all-
integrating societal role of religion disappeared. Yet they draw  exactly the opposite conclusion
than do the modernity theorists. The disintegration of the previous unified system is a challenge
for the individuals, who are now confronted with the need to establish their own meaningfully
configured and subjectively unified personal worlds. Modern persons participate in a multitude
of life-spheres each of which with its logic, prescriptions and expectations. They have to elaborate
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a practice which fits best to their individual values and goals, and minimalizes the conflicts
between clashing requirements from the sub-systems noted above. In this enterprise they need a
coherent set of stable values. Consequently, there is more need for religion than in any previous
age (Davie 2007, Hervieu-Léger 1999, Luhmann 1977). And the reference to God provides a firm
center for identity which is strong enough to integrate the multitude of partial identities as shaped
in different spheres of life. Be that as it may, religion is strong in Eastern and Central Europe. Its
attraction is growing in most countries of the region. Churches are important contributors to the
emergence of civil society as the biggest voluntary organizations (Fig. 1.) in insufficiently structured
societies.
Figure 1. 
The ratio of people who declare their adherence to a religion or/and a church in 14 countries of Eastern and Central Europe, in 1997
and 2007. (In per cent. Source: Aufbruch 1997, 2007)
There is yet another problem which has to be mentioned. Post-enlightenment thinking
supposed the existence of a general concept of religion. Doubts about the global usefulness of this
unifying concept increased parallel with the termination of the colonial era. Differences between
Protestant and Catholic ways of thinking and cultures are central issues of sociology since Max
Weber’s ‘Protestant ethic’ study (Weber 1993). Beyond historical evidences a large amount of
contemporary social scientific data documents the divergent behavioral and social consequences
of religiosity in both branches of Western Christianity. The end of the cold-war division of Europe,
the attempts of the European unification process, and the search for European identity intensified
debates about the specificity and social and cultural contents of Orthodoxy (Flere 2008, Titarenko
2008, Tomka 2006b). Maybe Europe is breathing with two lungs. At any rate, a thousand years of
separation of both parts of Europe, and disparate cultural developments in the regions of Eastern
and Western Christianity discriminate between the two models. The comportment in totalitarian
systems and the varying success in survival are interesting manifestations of the differing social
results of Catholicism, Protestantism and Orthodoxy. The scale of relevant variations does not end
within Christianity. September 11, 2001 and recent debates about EU-enlargement raised the
question of the compatibility of Christianity-based and Islamic culture. 
Even knowing the dangers of generalizations one has to remark, that contemporary
evidence proves a stronger communal and small-group-capacity in Catholicism, in contrast to a
stronger motivation to individualism in the Protestant milieu. Catholicism provided more spiritual
and institutional support in the opposition to totalitarian systems. Protestantism seems to be more
instrumental in initiating social change and in contributing to the emergence of accommodating
individualities. Catholic identity seems to be more strictly God- and Church-related. Protestant
identity can more easily accept non-belief within its confines, at least in Eastern and Central
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Europe. In Eastern and Central Europe Catholic culture refers more strongly to tradition and
nation; the Protestant position is, curiously, because of the looser ties to nation and tradition, more
universalistic.
In contrast to scrupulously institutionalized, organized and formalized Western
Christianity, Orthodox culture nurtured popular piety and spirituality. Western Christianity
separated the state and the church declaring an independent yet politically active role for the
church in Catholicism and a politically uninvolved, rather submissive one in Protestantism.
Orthodoxy preserved the state-church-tradition as well as the full adaptation of the church to the
ruler and the state in the concept of ‘symphonia’. Western Christianity developed a religiously
based social ethics and a wide network of institutions of social care. Orthodoxy remained passive
in this respect both in theory and in practice up the end of 20  century. Western Christianity quiteth
often contributed to the birth of nations and even to nationalism but preserved a critical capacity
of the individual and of the church vis-à-vis the political community. The unity of religion and
culture in Orthodoxy makes this religion the natural and exclusive bearer of social and national
identity and willing instruments of nationalist ideologies and politics without leaving much space
for critical distance.
Ecumenical and interreligious dialogue implicitly or explicitly supposes the existence of
a common denominator of all religions which is stronger than socially and historically grown
differences of actual believers and Churches. Further on, this kind of reasoning assumes that the
common basis of all religions is something which may lay the foundations of a peaceful coexistence
of humankind overcoming not only differences in convictions, but the inherently differentiated
character of modern society as well. That same way of thinking seems to presume, that this
imagined common kernel in religious identities offers values which are not present yet in non-
religious identities. These hidden or explicit presuppositions are theoretically problematic. They
may represent serious practical obstacles in social understanding as well as in reconciliation .
Notwithstanding conceptual difficulties religion is a major force in shaping individual and
social life, although functioning somewhat differently in various denominational cultures. Data
from Eastern and Central Europe  show that the majority of religious people declare that their2
religiosity influences their personal relations and their professional life. About one third asserts that
their religiosity influences their political views as well (Fig. 2.). These ratios are substantially higher
than in most Western European countries.
Figure 2. 
The ratio of people saying that their religiosity is influencing their behavior - among regular church-goers in different
denominations in the populations of Germany-East, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania, in 2007 (In per cent. Source: Aufbruch 2007)
 The data referred to is taken from the study “Aufbruch/New Departures” organized and processed  by Paul2
M. Zulehner, Vienna University and the present author. The first wave of the study (1977) was extensively communicated
(Tomka, Zulehner 1999, 2000 and in the German series „God after Communism”). The analysis of the 2007 survey is not
yet completed, but some initial findings have been  published (Zulehner, Tomka 2008, Zulehner, Tomka, Naletova 2008)
The results of „Aufbruch/New Departures” are congruent with other international comparative studies like the European
Values Study – World Values Study (Halman, et al. 2008.) and the International Social Survey (ISSP).
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Correspondingly with this finding a substantial part of public opinion supposes that
religious people behave differently from their non-religious fellow citizens. To this question we
refer once again to data from the post-communist region. About every second person does not
expect any difference in the behavior of religious and non-religious individuals. The other half of
the population does. This second part has a predominantly sympathetic idea about religious
people. Only tiny minorities believe that non-religious rather than religious people would
represent certain positions of pro-social or simply advantageous behavior. Members of different
denominations and unchurched people vary in their views; nevertheless in comparing religious
and nonreligious, a majority of the people in all ideological groups attribute to religious people
more favorable qualities and conduct (Fig.3.).
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Figure 3. 
The ratio of people saying that religious people are in specific ways different from the not religious ones - in different denominations
in Germany-East, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania, in 2007 (In per cent. Source: Aufbruch 2007)
T h e positive
image of religiosi
ty  a n d t h e
Church correlates in Eastern and Central Europe with convictions and expectations, according to
which the Church can and has to help in relevant individual and social issues. Public opinion
generally confirms the ability of churches and religious communities in helping in personal affairs.
Somewhat weaker is the belief in its capacity to solve social problems. In comparing of
denominational cultures, the Orthodox Church enjoys the most general trust, followed by the
Catholic and Protestant Churches and the Islamic community (Tab. 1.).
Table 1. 
The percentage of the population who believe that the big churches of the country do or can respond to substantial issues. (In
populations of 14 countries of Eastern and Central Europe. In per cent. Source: Aufbruch 2007)
Church or
Religious
Community
evaluated
Countries where the
respective Church
represents a substantial
ratio, and where questions
about this church were
asked
The...
questions
about
meaning of
life
Church can
moral
problems and
needs of
individuals
respond to
problems of
family life
...
actual
social
problems
of our
country
Catholic 14 countries of CEE 63.7 56.0 54.1 40.1
Protestant Germany-East, Slovakia,
Hungary, Romania
57.6 53.0 53.0 40.7
Orthodox Belarus, Lithuania,
Ukraine, Romania,
Moldavia, Serbia, Bulgaria
74.5 70.6 67.9 54.4
Islam Serbia, Bulgaria 45.0 44.8 40.6 28.8
It is a remarkable fact that big majorities within all denominations have an opinion about
what churches have to do. Even unchurched people have their ideas about topics the churches
should deal with. Spiritual and faith-issues range first, immediately followed by the requirement
of education of the people to mutual respect among demands concerning activities and
performances of the churches. Among 11 possible functions, reconciliation of people takes the
middle position, – after strictly religious and moral concerns and prior to community-oriented and
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societal roles. The ratio of people expecting certain performances of the churches differ by
denominations, but the general tendencies are similar. It is worth underscoring that three quarters
and more of even unchurched people express the view that churches exist in order to teach people
to respect each other and to reconcile people (Fig. 4.)
Reconciliation meets serious obstacles. Forgiveness can be one-sided. Reconciliation
requires at least two willing partners. As long as there is no inclination to repentance and
reparation among those who injured the rights of other people, as long as a group asserts its
oppressive position  self-righteously, reconciliation is almost impossible. In ideologically polarized
societies like in Eastern and Central Europe and in milieus, where a certain denomination is a
harassed minority it may be extremely difficult to foster reconciliation with ruling and oppressing
majorities.
Figure 4.
The ratio of people in varying ideological groups who expect from churches and religious communities the fulfillment of
different tasks (In the populations of 14 countries of ECC. In per cent. Source: Aufbruch 2007)
Religious People...
The Christian religion emphasizes the value of community. Jesus spent more time in
strengthening and teaching His small community of disciples than in teaching big masses. Stressing
the value of the person and personal relations Christianity prefers face-to-face relations to
impersonal social relations notwithstanding the Christian demand to love one’s neighbor and the
existence of a Christian social ethics. Religion may have a strong impact in conflicting situations,
if one’s personal identity or the identity of one’s community is endangered. It may be instrumental
in helping to develop and maintain an identity without hostility against out-groups. Preferential
options for the poor, for groups of oppressed people, for persecuted religious groups, for ethnic
minorities deprived of their right to their own identity etc. may make it impossible to promote
reconciliation with the rich, the persecutors, the oppressors.
An additional problem arises from the fact, that social and political divisions and
oppositions often coincide with religious and/or denominational differences. Northern Ireland and
Yugoslavia are recent examples.
Public opinion expects from religion to cure individual and social maladies. The genuine
vocation of religion is to strengthen human values, to help to stabilize personal identity, to
diminish social conflict, to promote reconciliation and human understanding (by leading and
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relating them to God). These objectives quite often clash with each other. It is almost impossible to
improve human relations and to advance reconciliation as long as people have shattered,
disintegrated and uncertain identities. The first step to reconciliation is the healing of wounded
identities.
There is, however, one aspect of religious identity which can lay the foundation for
reconciliation. Religions insist on human sinfulness. They call for self-examination in looking for
one’s part in contributing to evil in the world and to one’s chances to reduce it. The decision to start
with one’s own failures and the trust in God’s forgiveness and help in overcoming one’s
wickedness puts reconciliation in a new dimension. The realization of one’s own selfishness opens
the way for the understanding of different interests and motivations of adversaries. This is not yet
reconciliation but the disposition and willingness for it. And that is no small thing.
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